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INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE DISAGGREGATION OF DISPUTES: 
UKRAINE/RUSSIA AS A CASE STUDY 
Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne* 
 
This article explores the phenomenon of ‘disaggregation’ of disputes in international law, that is, the carving up of 
broader disputes into discrete legal claims based on different international legal rules and subject to the jurisdiction 
of different international tribunals. In particular, its focus is on certain under-explored consequences of this 
phenomenon for the jurisdiction of international tribunals, asking whether the relationship between the specific claims 
and the broader dispute might affect the jurisdiction of the tribunals. Employing the ongoing Ukraine/Russia 
dispute, which has yielded multiple claims before different international tribunals, the article offers an original 
analysis of these jurisdictional questions. It presents three approaches discernible from case law where tribunals face 
claims over which they appear to have jurisdiction that implicate a broader dispute over which they do not. The article 
ends with a consideration of possible explanations for why a tribunal might follow one approach over the others in 
any given case. 
 
Keywords: jurisdiction; international litigation; procedure; Ukraine; Russia; incidental 
determinations 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is well known that international law lacks an integrated system of international courts with 
general, compulsory jurisdiction. Instead, the structure of the international judiciary is 
decentralised, comprising multiple international courts and tribunals with differentiated 
jurisdictions. The consequence is often a disaggregation, or ‘compartmentalization’, of broader 
disputes into discrete legal claims before a range of international tribunals, each with jurisdiction 
to examine only those discrete claims.1 Sir Christopher Greenwood points to this disaggregation 
of disputes (in the context of compromissory clauses before the International Court of Justice) as 
a challenge frequently faced in international litigation: 
 
… [I]f jurisdiction can be based only upon a clause of this kind, the consequence may 
be that the Court has jurisdiction only in respect of one aspect of what may be a far 
broader dispute between the states concerned … One of the challenges for counsel in 
a case where the only basis for jurisdiction is a treaty dealing with a specific subject is 
to frame the case in such a way as to bring it within that treaty. An even greater 
challenge for the Court is to deal effectively with the case before it while remaining 
                                                          
* Associate Professor in Public International Law, University of Reading; l.hill-cawthorne@reading.ac.uk. I am very 
grateful to the editors and the anonymous reviewers for their very constructive feedback. An earlier version of this 
article was presented at the Faculty of Law, University of Oslo in September 2018; I am very grateful for comments 
received there. 
1 The language of ‘compartmentalization’ is borrowed from E Cannizzaro and B Bonafé, ‘Fragmenting International 
Law through Compromissory Clauses? Some Remarks of the Decision of the ICJ in the Oil Platforms case’ (2005) 16 
EJIL 481, 484. Similarly, see CJ Tams, ‘The Continued Relevance of Compromissory Clauses as a Source of ICJ 
Jurisdiction’ in T Giegerich (ed), A Wiser Century? Judicial Dispute Settlement, Disarmament, and the Laws of Wars 100 Years 
After the Second Hague Peace Conference (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2009) (‘… a jurisdiction that is treaty-specific thus 
favours the artificial truncation of disputes’); A Boyle, ‘Dispute Settlement and the Law of the Sea Convention: 
Problems of Fragmentation and Jurisdiction’ (1997) 46 ICLQ 37 (using the metaphor of ‘salami-slicing’); A 
Zimmerman, ‘Between the Quest for Universality and its Limited Jurisdiction: The Role of the International Court of 
Justice  in Enhancing the International Rule of Law’ in G Gaya and J Groute Stoutenburg (eds), Enhancing the Rule of 
Law Through the International Court of Justice (Brill, Leiden 2014) 40–1 (compromissory clauses ‘might force the applicant 
State to squeeze the facts through the eye of a needle, and thereby to frame its application with a focus on one 
particular treaty only.’). 
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faithful to the proper interpretation of the clause which confers jurisdiction and to the 
fundamental principle of consent as the basis for jurisdiction.2 
 
The range of tribunals before which claims have been brought concerning the ongoing dispute 
between Ukraine and the Russian Federation exemplifies this phenomenon of disaggregation. For 
the purposes of this article, this broad dispute refers to two particular issues arising subsequent to 
the ousting of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014.3 The first relates to 
Crimea and its annexation by Russia following the latter’s swift occupation of the peninsula and 
convening of a referendum there in March 2014, in which a reported 97% voted in favour of 
joining the Russian Federation.4 Ukraine continues to assert its claim to sovereignty over Crimea.5 
The second issue relates to alleged Russian support for separatist movements in eastern Ukraine 
since 2014, including in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk.6  
This broad dispute has been disaggregated into a number of discrete legal claims before 
different international tribunals.7 At the inter-state level, Ukraine has brought proceedings against 
Russia before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR), and two tribunals constituted under Annex VII of the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS).8 Five disputes between Ukraine and Russia have also made their way to the 
WTO dispute settlement system. With respect to mixed claims (where the parties are a mix of state 
and non-state actors), 4,300 individual claims are currently pending before the ECtHR that all 
appear related to the Ukraine/Russia dispute, and nine known investor-state arbitrations have been 
initiated by Ukrainian investors in Crimea against Russia. Finally, whereas the above claims all 
concern the invocation of state responsibility, the Ukraine/Russia dispute has also led to 
considerations of individual responsibility under international law. Thus, there is an ongoing 
preliminary examination into the situation in Crimea and eastern Ukraine by the Office of the 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC).  
This article explores this phenomenon of the disaggregation of disputes in international law, 
employing the Ukraine/Russia dispute as a case study.9 The topic is, to an extent, related to the 
issue of the multiplication of international courts and tribunals, which has been explored in detail 
elsewhere.10 It is not the purpose of the present contribution to rehearse what is already covered 
                                                          
2 CJ Greenwood, ‘Some Challenges of International Litigation’ (2012) 1 Cambridge J Intl & Comp L 7, 16.  
3 W Booth, ‘Ukraine’s Parliament Votes to Oust President; Former Prime Minister is Freed From Prison’, The 
Washington Post, 22 February 2014; S Walker, ‘Ousted Ukrainian Leader Viktor Yanukovych Reported to be in Russia’, 
The Guardian, 27 February 2014. 
4 SL Myers and E Barry, ‘Putin Reclaims Crimea for Russia and Bitterly Denounces the West’, The New York Times, 18 
March 2014. 
5 President of Ukraine, ‘President: After Restoration of its Sovereignty in Crimea, Ukraine Will Use the Kerch Strait 
Bridge for Ties with the Kuban’, 18 May 2018, available at https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ukrayina-pislya-
vidnovlennya-svogo-suverenitetu-v-krimu-viko-47522.  
6 ‘Ukraine Says Donetsk “Anti-Terror Operation” Under Way’, BBC News, 16 April 2014; DM Herszenhorn and P 
Baker, ‘Russia Steps Up Help for Rebels in Ukraine War’, The New York Times, 25 July 2014; A Luhn and D Roberts, 
‘Ukraine Condemns “Direct Invasion” as Russian Aid Convoy Crosses Border’, The Guardian, 23 August 2014; 
‘Ukraine Separatists Declare Independence’, Al-Jazeera, 12 May 2014; J Coman, ‘On the Frontline of Europe’s 
Forgotten War in Ukraine’, The Guardian, 12 November 2017. 
7 The claims referred to here are cited in full when discussed later in the article. 
8 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 
1994), 1833 UNTS 3. 
9 The term ‘disaggregation’ is used here over other frequently used descriptions of this phenomenon, such as ‘framing’ 
of disputes or ‘compartmentalization’. It is considered that ‘disaggregation’ better captures the fact, particularly 
featured in the Ukraine/Russia litigation, that each claim is often not merely a different way of framing the broader 
dispute but a specific legal claim arising from that broader dispute and existing in parallel with other specific legal 
claims. It also reminds us that this phenomenon is not merely a litigation strategy but also a structural feature of 
international judicial settlement.  
10 For a very small selection, see, eg, ‘Address by HE Judge Gilbert Guillaume, President of the International Court 
of Justice, to the United Nations General Assembly’, 26 October 2000, available at https://www.icj-
cij.org/files/press-releases/9/2999.pdf; JI Charney, ‘Is International Law Threatened by Multiple International 
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there. Instead, the aim of this article is to use this case study to examine certain under-explored 
consequences of the disaggregation of disputes for the jurisdiction of tribunals. More specifically, 
it focuses on two questions. First, what is the relationship between the specific claims before each 
of the tribunals in these cases and other aspects of the broader Ukraine/Russia dispute? Second, 
what impact might the disaggregation of the dispute have on the jurisdiction of the tribunals? In 
particular, might the relationship between the specific claims before each tribunal and the broader 
dispute affect the jurisdiction of the tribunals over those specific claims? This is particularly 
pertinent, given Russia’s jurisdictional objections before some of the tribunals that Ukraine’s 
specific claims are inseparable from the broader dispute over which the tribunal lacks jurisdiction, 
with the consequence that the tribunal cannot exercise jurisdiction over any part of the claims.11  
Some recent scholarship examines some of the legal claims arising from the Ukraine/Russia 
dispute, as well as some of the jurisdictional issues addressed in this article.12 However, the present 
article advances the current literature in at least two ways. First, it is more comprehensive than the 
previous literature on the Ukraine/Russia dispute in terms of the range of tribunals and types of 
claims examined. Second, and most importantly, it also goes beyond that previous literature in its 
treatment of the jurisdictional issues explored. In particular, this article offers an original analysis 
of the approach of different tribunals to the jurisdictional issues considered here, suggesting three 
distinct approaches to disaggregation across jurisprudence: first, the severability approach, by 
which a tribunal stresses the severability of the specific claims before it from any broader dispute; 
second, the restrictive approach, by which a tribunal views the claims before it as inseparable from 
that broader dispute and, as a result, declines jurisdiction even over those specific claims; and, 
third, the expansive approach, by which the tribunal does not attempt to sever the claims before 
it from the broader dispute and, instead, willingly makes incidental determinations that would 
otherwise be beyond its jurisdiction when ruling on the specific claims. In the final section, the 
article also draws these doctrinal questions of jurisdiction back to broader considerations about 
the role of particular tribunals and the international judicial function more generally. Though the 
Ukraine/Russia dispute is used a case study, it will become clear that these issues arise frequently 
in international litigation, and thus the present contribution offers an analysis of relevance generally 
to international dispute settlement.  
The article is structured as follows. Section two introduces in turn the claims before each 
tribunal and their potential implications for the broader Ukraine/Russia dispute. Section three then 
elaborates on the three approaches to disaggregation and the jurisdictional questions raised above 
that one can draw out of the jurisprudence of different international courts and tribunals. Section 
four then offers an explanation of the different approaches to these issues and, in particular, 
                                                          
Tribunals?’ (1998) 271 RdC 1; B Kingsbury, ‘Foreword: Is the Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals a 
Systemic Problem?’ (1999) 31 AJIL 679; P-M Dupuy, ‘The Danger of Fragmentation or Unification of the 
International Legal System and the International Court of Justice’ (1999) 31 AJIL 791; G Abi-Saab, ‘Fragmentation 
or Unification? Some Concluding Remarks’ (1999) 31 AJIL 919; K Oellers-Frahm, ‘Multiplication of International 
Courts and Tribunals and Conflicting Jurisdiction – Problems and Possible Solutions’ (2001) 5 Max Planck YB UN L 
67; J Pauwelyn and EL Salles, ‘Forum Shopping before International Tribunals: (Real) Concerns, (Im)Possible 
Solutions’ (2009) 42 Cornell Intl LJ 77; P Webb, International Judicial Integration and Fragmentation (OUP, Oxford 2016); 
A Pellet, ‘Should We (Still) Worry About Fragmentation?’ in A Føllesdal and G Ulfstein (eds), The Judicialization of 
International Law: A Mixed Blessing? (OUP, Oxford 2018); L Boisson de Chazournes, ‘Plurality in the Fabric of 
International Courts and Tribunals: The Threads of a Managerial Approach’ (2017) 28 EJIL 13. 
11 As discussed below, Russia has invoked this preliminary objection before both the ICJ and Annex VII tribunals: 
see below at text to nn 89–92 and text to nn 120–21, respectively. 
12 TD Grant, ‘International Dispute Settlement in Response to an Unlawful Seizure of Territory: Three Mechanisms’ 
(2015) 16 Chicago J Intl L 1; OG Repousis, ‘Why Russian Investment Treaties Could Apply to Crimea and What 
Would This Mean for the Ongoing Russo-Ukrainian Territorial Conflict’ (2016) 32 Arb Intl 459; RG Volterra, GF 
Mandelli, and Á Nistal, ‘The Characterization of the Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, 
and Kerch Strait’ (2018) 33 Intl J Maritime & Coastal L 614; P Tzeng, ‘The Implicated Issue Problem: Indispensable 
Issues and Incidental Jurisdiction’ (2018) 50 NYU J Intl L & Pol 447; G Nuridzhanian, ‘Crimea in International Courts 
and Tribunals: Matters of Jurisdiction’ (2018) 21 Max Planck YB UN Law 378. 
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considers whether the nature of a particular tribunal might go some way in explaining its approach 
to these questions. Some concluding remarks will be offered in section five. 
 
 
 
II. THE UKRAINE/RUSSIA CLAIMS AND THEIR POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BROADER 
DISPUTE 
 
The purpose of this section is briefly to introduce the principal claims in the Ukraine/Russia 
dispute. The claims before each tribunal are set out in turn, together with a brief consideration of 
their implications for the broader inter-state dispute. 
 
A. International Court of Justice 
 
In January 2017, Ukraine instituted proceedings before the ICJ against Russia. The claims concern 
alleged violations of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism (ICSFT) in eastern Ukraine and of the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in Crimea.13  
It is, of course, the compromissory clauses in the ICSFT and CERD that explains Ukraine’s 
invocation of these treaties.14 In its application, Ukraine points in passing to a range of other alleged 
violations by Russia, including violations of the principle of non-intervention, the prohibitions on 
the use of force and conquest, and the right to life of Ukrainian nationals.15 However, in the 
absence of optional clause declarations from either state, compromissory clauses in relevant 
treaties, such as the UN Charter or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,16 or a 
special agreement between the parties, there exists no explicit basis for the Court to exercise 
jurisdiction over claims relating to these other aspects of the broader dispute. The ICSFT and 
CERD offer the only door through which the Court might examine certain aspects of Ukraine’s 
allegations.  
This brings us to the question of the possible ways in which that broader dispute might 
nonetheless be implicated in the Court’s assessment of the specific legal claims before it. Regarding 
the CERD claims, none of those claims clearly implicates the occupation and annexation of 
Crimea, as the majority of the provisions in CERD are not territorially limited. Nonetheless, at 
various points in its memorial, Ukraine does allude to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in the context 
of its CERD claims. For example, Ukraine submits that interpreting certain provisions of CERD 
requires a renvoi to Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which only applies in occupied 
territory.17 Furthermore, Ukraine argues that Russia cannot invoke those clauses in CERD 
providing for certain non-precluded measures as that would be tantamount to allowing Russia to 
                                                          
13 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (adopted 9 December 1999, entered 
into force 10 April 2002), 2178 UNTS 197 (hereinafter ‘ICSFT’); International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (adopted 7 March 1966, entered into force 4 January 1969), 660 UNTS 195 
(hereinafter ‘CERD’). 
14 Art 24(1) ICSFT; Art 22 CERD. 
15 See, eg, Application of the International Convention  for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v Russia), Application Instituting Proceedings, 
16 January 2017, [1]–[4]. 
16 Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945), 1 UNTS XVI; 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976), 
999 UNTS 171.  
17 Case Concerning Application of the International Convention  for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v Russian Federation), Memorial (Submitted by 
Ukraine), 12 June 2018, [614]. 
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invoke its own unlawful conduct (its annexation of Crimea) to justify its actions.18 How the Court 
will engage with these submissions remains to be seen. 
Regarding the ICSFT, the position may be more complicated. Throughout the proceedings 
thus far, Ukraine alleges as part of its ICSFT claims, inter alia, that Russia directly finances 
separatist groups in eastern Ukraine that carry out terrorist attacks.19 Russia has responded that the 
focus of the ICSFT is on states parties cooperating to suppress the financing of such actions by 
private actors, as opposed to the financing of such acts by states themselves.20 Part of Ukraine’s 
reasoning here relies on an analogy to the Court’s approach to a similar question in Bosnia v Serbia,21 
which, if accepted, might enable the Court to consider claims of direct Russian support for 
separatists as part of the ICSFT claims.22 Should the Court take up this invitation, the scope for 
the ICJ to draw on the broader dispute between Ukraine and Russia would be enlarged. 
 
B. Annex VII UNCLOS tribunal 
 
Under the auspices of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), Ukraine instituted inter-state 
arbitral proceedings in September 2016 against Russia under Annex VII of UNCLOS, alleging 
various violations by Russia of Ukraine’s rights under the Convention.23 In addition, Ukraine has 
instituted further Annex VII proceedings in relation to Russia’s seizure and detention of Ukrainian 
warships and their crews in the Kerch Strait in November 2018; pending constitution of that 
Tribunal, Ukraine requested the indication of provisional measures by the International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).24  
It is particularly with respect to the 2016 UNCLOS claims that the broader territorial dispute 
concerning Crimea may be implicated, and even more so than in the ICJ proceedings.25 This is 
because they involve claims that Russia has violated Ukraine’s rights as the coastal state under 
UNCLOS in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov and Kerch Strait.26 Given the law of the sea principle that 
sovereignty over maritime areas is determined by sovereignty over adjacent land (the so-called 
‘land dominates the sea’ principle), this requires a determination of which state is the territorial 
                                                          
18 Ibid, [613], [625]–[626].  
19 Ibid, [296]–[318]; Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v Russian Federation), Order 
(Provisional Measures), 19 April 2017, [66], [68]. 
20 Case Concerning Application of the International Convention  for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections 
(Submitted by the Russian Federation): Vol I, [126]–[227].  
21 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzeogovina v Serbia and 
Montenegro) (Merits Judgment) [2007] ICJ Rep 43, [166] (‘[i]t would be paradoxical if States were under an obligation 
to prevent, so far as within their power, commission of genocide by persons over whom they have a certain influence, 
but were not forbidden to commit such acts through their own organs . . . In short, the obligation to prevent genocide 
necessarily implies the prohibition of the commission of genocide’). 
22 For an articulation of the opposing views on this, see Memorial (Ukraine) (n 17) [306]–[307]; Preliminary Objections 
(Russia) (n 20) [199]–[209]. 
23 Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait (Ukraine v Russian Federation) , PCA 
Case No 2017-06, Proceedings Commenced 16 September 2016. 
24 Case Concerning the Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukraine v Russian Federation), Case No 26 (ITLOS), 
Request for the Prescription of Provisional Measures (Order), 25 May 2019. 
25 In the case of the November 2018 UNCLOS proceedings, Ukraine emphasises that its claims are agnostic as to 
where sovereignty over Crimea lies: Case Concerning the Detention of Three Ukrainian Vessels (Ukraine v Russian Federation), 
ITLOS/PV.19/C26/1, Verbatim Record, 10 May 2019, 13. Though note Russia’s disagreement on this point: Case 
Concerning the Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukraine v The Russian Federation), Case No 26 (ITLOS), 
Provisional Measures (Memorandum of the Government of the Russian Federation), 7 May 2019, 15 (fn 58). 
26 For a list of Ukraine’s claims in this case, see In the Matter of a Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, 
Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait (Ukraine v The Russian Federation), PCA Case No 2017-06, Written Observations and 
Submissions of Ukraine on Jurisdiction, 27 November 2018, [23]. 
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sovereign in Crimea.27 Indeed, in contrast to its pleadings thus far in the UNCLOS dispute relating 
to the November 2018 Kerch Straight incident,28 Ukraine does not dispute that its 2016 claims are 
premised on its sovereignty over Crimea.29 These particular UNCLOS claims thus seem to 
implicate the sovereignty dispute over Crimea. 
 
C. European Court of Human Rights  
 
The claims before the ECtHR comprise both inter-state and mixed claims. At the time of writing, 
there are five pending inter-state applications to the ECtHR brought by Ukraine against Russia 
relating to the dispute under consideration here.30 These include two consolidated cases, pending 
before the Grand Chamber at the time of writing, one of which relates to claims concerning Crimea 
and the other to claims concerning eastern Ukraine.31 In these cases, Ukraine alleges Russian 
responsibility for violations of a range of rights protected under the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) in Crimea and eastern Ukraine,32 arguing that Russia exercises jurisdiction 
by virtue of its effective control over Crimea and its control of separatists and armed groups in 
eastern Ukraine.33 The third case concerns the alleged abduction of three groups of children in 
eastern Ukraine by separatist forces and their temporary transfer to Russia.34 The fourth is an 
August 2018 application lodged by Ukraine that concerns the detention and prosecution of 
Ukrainian nationals by Russia.35 The fifth case relates to the November 2018 incident in the Kerch 
Strait.36  
In addition to the inter-state applications, at the time of writing there are also approximately 
4,300 individual applications before the ECtHR, against both Russia and Ukraine, that all appear 
related to the events in Crimea or eastern Ukraine.37 Amongst the pending cases are claims against 
Ukraine by relatives of the victims of the MH17 disaster who allege that Ukraine failed to protect 
those victims’ lives by not closing their airspace over the armed conflict in the region (thus violating 
their positive obligations).38 Russia’s responsibility for the destruction of MH17 is similarly invoked 
in some of these individual applications, both in the form of directly attributing the attack to Russia 
and as an alleged violation of Russia’s positive obligations.39  
                                                          
27 See, eg, North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), 
Judgment (Merits) [1969] ICJ Rep 3, [96]; Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v Turkey) [1978] ICJ Rep 3, [186]. 
28 See above at n 25. 
29 In the Matter of a Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait (Ukraine v The Russian 
Federation), PCA Case No 2017-06, Rejoinder of Ukraine on Jurisdiction, 28 March 2019, [10]–[11] (arguing instead 
that Russia has no plausible claim to Crimea and thus that there is no true dispute over its status). 
30 See ECtHR Press Release, ‘ECHR to adjourn some individual applications on Eastern Ukraine pending Grand 
Chamber judgment in related inter-State case’, ECHR 432 (2018), 17 December 2018. 
31 Ukraine v Russia (re Crimea), App No 20958/14; Ukraine v Russia (re Eastern Ukraine), App No 8019/16. 
32 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 4 November 1950, entered 
into force 3 September 1953), 213 UNTS 221. 
33 ECtHR Press Release, ‘European Court of Human Rights deals with cases concerning Crimea and Eastern Ukraine’, 
ECHR 345 (2014), 26 November 2014; ECtHR Press Release, ‘European Court of Human Rights communicates to 
Russia to inter-State case concerning events in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine’, ECHR 296 (2015), 1 October 2015. 
34 Ukraine v Russia (II), App No 43800/14; see ECtHR Press Release, ‘European Court of Human Rights deals with 
cases concerning Crimea and Eastern Ukraine’, ECHR 345 (2014), 26 November 2014. 
35 Ukraine v Russia (VII), App No 38334/18; see ECtHR Press Release, ‘New inter-State application brought by 
Ukraine against Russia’, ECHR 277 (2018), 27 August 2018. 
36 Ukraine v Russia (VIII), App No 55855/18; see ECtHR Press Release, ‘ECHR puts questions to Russian Government 
after receiving new inter-State case from Ukraine concerning events in the Sea of Azov’, ECHR 412 (2018), 30 
November 2018. 
37 ECtHR Press Unit, Armed Conflicts (May 2018) 17, available at 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Armed_conflicts_ENG.pdf.  
38 Ioppa et al v Ukraine, App Nos 73776/14, 974/15, 4407/15, 4412/15. 
39 Ayley and others v Russia, Angline and others v Russia, App Nos 25714/16 and 56328/18. 
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In certain respects, these ECHR claims are likely to implicate the broader inter-state dispute. 
It is clear that Russia’s alleged intervention in eastern Ukraine will directly be raised in these cases, 
as the Court will need to consider whether Russia exercises Article 1 ECHR jurisdiction in the 
region, including, potentially, through the separatists operating there.40 Indeed, in its previous case 
law, the Court has held states responsible for the actions of separatists on another state’s territory 
on the basis of the foreign state’s control, though it has not been made clear whether that is a 
result of its control over territory (thus engaging the positive obligations of the state in areas within 
its jurisdiction) or control over the separatists themselves whose actions are then attributable to 
the state.41 In either case, however, assessing the ECHR claims would likely require a consideration 
of the degree of Russian intervention in eastern Ukraine and its support of separatists.  
The relationship between the ECHR claims and the sovereignty dispute over Crimea is more 
complicated. On the one hand, the Court’s extensive jurisprudence on extraterritoriality 
demonstrates its willingness to extend the Convention to territory over which states parties 
exercise effective control.42 This would suggest that there is no need to consider the sovereignty 
question in order to determine the applicability of the Convention to Russia’s actions in Crimea. 
Nevertheless, questions of sovereignty have arisen in previous ECHR cases for the purposes of 
finding a (limited) residual jurisdiction of the sovereign state in parallel with (full) jurisdiction of 
the foreign state exercising effective control.43 Furthermore, the Court might also be drawn into 
the sovereignty question at the merits stage if it is called on to make a renvoi to IHL to interpret 
the Convention rights in the Crimea context.44 Thus, it may be faced with the question of the 
applicability of the law of occupation to Crimea, with the consequence that it would need to 
determine whether Russia is an occupying power or the sovereign in the peninsula.45  
 
D. WTO disputes46 
 
At the time of writing, two cases are pending before the WTO dispute settlement system between 
Russia and Ukraine,47 with panel reports having recently been issued in three further cases.48 Unlike 
the proceedings noted above, these do not concern claims arising directly from the dispute over 
Crimea or eastern Ukraine. Instead, they all concern the compatibility with WTO law of various 
                                                          
40 ECtHR Press Release, ‘ECHR to adjourn some individual applications on Eastern Ukraine pending Grand Chamber 
judgment in related inter-State case’, ECHR 432 (2018), 17 December 2018 (recognising the need to determine which 
state has Article 1 jurisdiction in eastern Ukraine, and adjourning individual applications concerning the region until 
the jurisdictional issue is addressed in Ukraine v Russia (re Eastern Ukraine), App No 8019/16); Ayley and others v Russia, 
Angline and others v Russia, App Nos 25714/16 and 56328/18, Communication dated 3 April 2019 (asking the parties 
on what basis Russia exercised jurisdiction in eastern Ukraine). 
41 Ilaşcu et al v Moldova & Russia, App No 48787/99, Judgment of 8 July 2004 (Grand Chamber); Catan v Moldova & 
Russia, 43370/04, 8252/05, 18454/06, Judgment of 19 October 2012 (Grand Chamber); Sandu and others v Moldova and 
Russia, App No 21034/05 and others, Judgment of 17 July 2018; M Milanović & T Papić, ‘The Applicability of the 
ECHR in Contested Territories’ (2018) 67 ICLQ 779, 789.  
42 The leading case on this remains Al-Skeini et al v United Kingdom, App No 55721/07, Judgment of 7 July 2011 (Grand 
Chamber).  
43 Ilaşcu (n 41) [330]–[331]; Catan (n 41) [109]–[110]; Sandu (n 41) [34]–[35]. For critiques of the concept of residual 
jurisdiction, see Milanović and Papić (n 41); L Raible, ‘Title to Territory and Jurisdiction in International Human 
Rights Law: Three Models for a Fraught Relationship’ (2018) 31 Leiden J Intl L 315. 
44 The Strasbourg Court has explicitly employed IHL to interpret the Convention in the context of an international 
armed conflict in Hassan v United Kingdom, App No 29750/09, Judgment of 10 September 2014 (Grand Chamber).  
45 The Court in Hassan v United Kingdom held that it would only consider such questions of IHL if specifically pleaded: 
ibid, [107].  
46 I am very grateful to Nicolas Lamp for discussions that have informed this section.   
47 Ukraine – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services (Russia), DS525; Russia – Measures Concerning the Importation and 
Transit of Certain Ukrainian Products (Ukraine), DS532. 
48 Russia – Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit (Ukraine) [2019] WT/DS512/R (Panel Report); Ukraine – Anti-Dumping 
Measures on Ammonium Nitrate (Russia) [2018] WT/DS493/R (Panel Report); Russia – Measures Affecting the Importation of 
Railway Equipment and Parts Thereof (Ukraine) [2018] WT/DS499/R (Panel Report).   
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trade-related measures introduced by each state. In this sense, one could view them as entirely 
separate from the broader inter-state dispute that is the focus of this article.  
However, the WTO cases are included here given the potential for aspects of the broader 
dispute between Ukraine and Russia to arise in these proceedings. For example, in the recently 
adopted panel report in Russia – Traffic in Transit, Ukraine challenged a number of Russian 
restrictions on Ukrainian traffic in transit through Russia to third states. In defence, Russia 
successfully invoked Article XXI(b)(iii) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
to justify its measures,49 and the panel was thus the first WTO panel called on to address the long-
standing debate over the justiciability of that provision.50 Russia’s invocation of Article XXI(b)(iii), 
in permitting action considered necessary by the state for its essential security interests ‘taken in 
time of war or other emergency in international relations’, could have implicated aspects of the 
broader dispute between Ukraine and Russia. This would be the case, for example, had Ukraine 
claimed that Russia’s reliance on Article XXI(b)(iii) represented an abuse of right on the basis of 
the latter’s alleged intervention in eastern Ukraine and its occupation of Crimea. Simply put, 
Russia’s reliance on a situation to which it allegedly has contributed so as to justify deviation from 
its obligations could, on this argument, be viewed as a bad faith invocation by Russia of Article 
XXI(b)(iii).51 Though Ukraine has raised a similar argument in the ICJ proceedings with respect to 
certain non-precluded measures under CERD,52 as well as in the UNCLOS proceedings in 
response to Russia’s preliminary objections,53 there is no indication that it made such an argument 
before the WTO panel.54 The Dispute Settlement Body subsequently adopted the panel report, 
but whether similar arguments might arise in other cases remains to be seen. 
 
E. Investment arbitrations 
 
                                                          
49 Russia – Traffic in Transit (n 48), [7.27]–[7.149].  
50 The panel rejected the self-judging view of Article XXI GATT: ibid. See the different views on this in the third 
party submissions: Russia – Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit (DS512), European Union Third Party Written 
Submission, 8 November 2017; Russia – Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit (DS512), Third Party Oral Statement of 
the United States, 25 January 2018. More generally, see RP Alford, ‘The Self-Judging WTO Security Exception’ [2011] 
Utah L Rev 697; JY Yoo and D Ahn, ‘Security Exceptions in the WTO System: Bridge or Bottle-Neck for Trade and 
Security?’ (2016) 19 JIEL 417; D Akande and S Williams, ‘International Adjudication on National Security Issues: 
What Role for the WTO?’ (2003) 43 Va J Intl L 365. 
51 The panel in Russia – Traffic in Transit (n 48) at [7.132] held the chapeau of Article XXI(b) to be subject to the principle 
of good faith. The WTO Appellate Body has previously held that the principle of good faith and the doctrine of abus 
de droit are embodied in the chapeau of Article XX GATT: United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products (United States), WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October 1998, [158].  
52 Memorial (Ukraine) (n 17) [613], [625]–[626]. 
53 Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait, Written Observations and 
Submissions of Ukraine on Jurisdiction (n 26) [32]; Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, 
and Kerch Strait, Rejoinder of Ukraine on Jurisdiction (n 29) 13 (fn 56). 
54 Russia – Traffic in Transit (n 48) [7.121]. 
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A number of individual claims55 have also been brought by Ukrainian investors against Russia 
under the 1998 bilateral investment treaty (BIT) between the two states.56 These cases involve 
claims by Ukrainian investors of violations of the BIT by Russia in Crimea.57 Russia has refused to 
engage with these claims on the basis that it does not recognise the jurisdiction of the tribunals.58 
As mixed claims by individual investors against Russia, as opposed to claims by Ukraine, 
these are, of course, quite distinct from the inter-state claims discussed above and the broader 
inter-state dispute. Indeed, the dual-track nature of mixed and inter-state claims under BITs 
(including under the 1998 Russia-Ukraine BIT) ensures that private investors’ claims in these 
mixed cases are legally distinct from any inter-state claims.59 However, it is clear that these investor-
state arbitrations do implicate the inter-state dispute. First, Ukraine’s interest in these cases is 
confirmed by its successful applications to make written submissions as a non-disputing party.60 
Second, though the majority of the BIT claims are brought by wholly private Ukrainian investors, 
two of the known cases involve (Ukrainian) state-owned claimants.61 This indicates a closer link 
between at least some of these BIT claims and the broader inter-state dispute than the formal 
bifurcation of investor-state and inter-state proceedings under the BIT suggests.  
Third, and most importantly for our purposes, these claims call for an application of Russia’s 
obligations under the 1998 BIT to Crimea. The BIT covers investments by one of the state’s 
nationals in the ‘territory’ of the other state.62 The success of these claims thus appears conditioned 
on the tribunals’ recognition that Crimea now forms part of Russia’s ‘territory’ for the purposes 
of the BIT (and that those that were previously domestic Ukrainian investors became foreign 
investors protected by the BIT following Russia’s intervention in Crimea). Like the Annex VII 
tribunal addressing Ukraine’s UNCLOS claims, and potentially the ECtHR regarding the ECHR 
claims, it would appear that these investment tribunals would need to make determinations 
regarding the territorial status of Crimea in order to rule on the merits of the claims. As explained 
below, however, in some recent decisions the tribunals have sought to avoid any such suggestion 
of a relationship between the BIT claims and the broader sovereignty dispute.  
                                                          
55 At the time of writing, nine cases have been registered with the PCA and/or reported: NJSC Naftogaz of Ukraine 
(Ukraine) et al v The Russian Federation, PCA Case No 2017-16, Proceedings Commenced 17 October 2016; Everest 
Estate LLC et al v The Russian Federation, PCA Case No 2015-36, Proceedings Commenced 19 June 2015; PJSC Ukrnafta 
v The Russian Federation, PCA Case No 2015-34, Proceedings Commenced 15 June 2015; Stabil LLC et al v The Russian 
Federation, PCA Case No 2015-35, Proceedings Commenced 15 June 2015; Limited Liability Company Lugzor et al v The 
Russian Federation, PCA Case No 2015-29, Proceedings Commenced 26 May 2015; PJSC CB PrivatBank and Finance 
Company Finilon LLC v The Russian Federation, PCA Case No 2015-21, Proceedings Commenced 13 April 2015; Aeroport 
Belbek LLC and Mr. Igor Valeriecich Kolomoisky v The Russian Federation, PCA Case No 2015-07, Proceedings Commenced 
13 January 2015. The other two cases, Oschadbank v Russian Federation and DTEK Krymenergo v Russian Federation, are 
reported: see, respectively, Luke Eric Peterson, ‘In the First of a Possible Wave of BIT Claims by Ukraine State-
Owned Entities Against Russia, An UNCITRAL Tribunal is Finalized’, IAReporter, 14 August 2016; ‘Russian BIT 
Claims: Recent Developments in Arbitrations Against the Russian Federation’, IAReporter, 13 April 2017.  
56 Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Cabinet of Ministers of the Ukraine on the 
Encouragement and Mutual Protection of Investments (adopted 27 November 1998, entered into force 27 January 
2000) 7 Bull Intl Treaties 18. 
57 See, eg, ‘Ukraine’s Naftogaz Files BIT Arbitration Against Russia’, IAReporter, 19 October 2016; PCA Press Release, 
‘Arbitration between Everest Estate LLC and Others as Claimants and the Russian Federation’, 9 August 2016; PCA 
Press Release, ‘Arbitration between PJSC Ukrnafta as Claimant and the Russian Federation–Arbitration between Stabil 
LLC and Ten Others as Claimants and the Russian Federation’,  2 May 2016; PCA Press Release, ‘Arbitration Between 
Aeroport Belbek LLC and Mr. Igor Valerievich Kolomoisky as Claimants and the Russian Federation’, 6 January 2016. 
58 See, eg, PCA Press Release, 6 January 2016 (n 57). 
59 Art 9 of the 1998 BIT (on investor-state dispute settlement) and Art 10 of the 1998 BIT (on inter-state dispute 
settlement).  
60 See, eg, PCA Press Release, ‘Arbitration between PJSC Ukrnafta as Claimant and The Russian Federation – 
Arbitration between Stabil LC and Ten Others as Claimants and The Russian Federation’, 4 August 2016; PCA Press 
Release, ‘Arbitration between Everest Estate LLC and Others as Claimants and the Russian Federation’, 13 January 
2017. 
61 ‘Ukraine’s Naftogaz Files BIT Arbitration Against Russia’ (n 57); Peterson (n 55). 
62 See especially Arts 1(1), 2(1), 4 and 5(1) of the 1998 BIT. 
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F. International criminal proceedings63 
 
A number of efforts have been made to hold individuals accountable for violations of international 
law committed in the course of the hostilities in Ukraine. Particularly prominent have been 
attempts to hold to account those responsible for the destruction of Malaysia Airlines Flight 
MH17. For example, an attempt to create an International Criminal Tribunal for Malaysia Airlines 
Flight MH17 through a draft Security Council resolution was vetoed by Russia in July 2015.64 
Others have suggested alternative venues for invoking individual responsibility, particularly with 
respect to MH17, such as an adversarial model of a commission of inquiry, an international 
criminal tribunal established by the General Assembly, national criminal proceedings65 or a 
Lockerbie-style court.66  
Against this background, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC is examining 
allegations of international crimes committed in Ukraine. Though Ukraine is not a party to the 
Rome Statute,67 following the Euromaiden protests the new government lodged two declarations 
under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute. The first, deposited on 17 April 2014, focused on crimes 
committed during the Euromaiden protests between 21 November 2013 and 22 February 2014.68 
The second, dated 8 September 2015, extended this by granting the ICC jurisdiction ‘for the 
purpose of identifying, prosecuting and judging the perpetrators and accomplices of acts 
committed in the territory of Ukraine since 20 February 2014’.69 This second declaration thus 
potentially brings events in eastern Ukraine and Crimea within the jurisdiction of the Court. The 
situation in Ukraine is currently under preliminary examination by the OTP to determine whether 
the cumulative requirements of jurisdiction, admissibility and the interests of justice are met in 
order to open an investigation.70 With respect to Crimea and eastern Ukraine, the Prosecutor has 
collected information on crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction allegedly committed in those 
regions.71  
Notwithstanding the nature of these proceedings as ones concerning individual criminal 
responsibility, there is a clear relationship between them and the broader inter-state dispute. First, 
and most fundamentally, there is a need to consider whether Crimea is a part of Ukraine’s 
‘territory’, at least for the purposes of the Rome Statute, as the Court’s jurisdiction over events 
there is conditional on such a finding.72  
Second, the relationship between the specific investigations before the ICC and the broader 
inter-state dispute also arises with respect to the applicable law. In particular, there is a need to 
consider the character of any armed conflict that may exist in Crimea or eastern Ukraine, in order 
                                                          
63 I am very grateful to Rogier Bartels for discussions that have informed this section. 
64 UN Security Council Draft Resolution, S/2015/562, 29 July 2015. For details of the vote, see UN Security Council 
Press Release, ‘Security Council Fails to Adopt Resolution on Tribunal for Malaysia Airlines Crash in Ukraine, Amid 
Calls for Accountability, Justice for Victims’, SC/11990, 29 July 2015. 
65 Criminal investigations in the Netherlands have led to charges being brought against four individuals (three of whom 
are Russian nationals), with trials reportedly due to the start there (likely in absentia) in March 2020: see L Harding, 
‘Three Russians and one Ukrainian to face MH17 murder charges’, The Guardian, 19 June 2019. 
66 See, eg, JM Lemnitzer, ‘International Commissions of Inquiry and the North Sea Incident: A Model for a MH17 
Tribunal?’ (2016) 27 EJIL 923 (invoking the North Sea Incident Commission of 1905 as precedent for a legally-
oriented international commission of inquiry); S Williams, ‘MH17 and the International Criminal Court: A Suitable 
Venue?’ (2016) 17 Melb J Intl L 210. 
67 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002), 2187 
UNTS 3. 
68 See https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/997/declarationVerkhovnaRadaEng.pdf. 
69 See https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/other/Ukraine_Art_12-3_declaration_08092015.pdf.  
70 Art 53(1) of the Rome Statute. 
71 At the time of writing, the most recent outline of the process is OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 
2018, [59]–[98]. 
72 Arts 12(2)(a) and 12(3) of the Rome Statute. Ukraine’s Article 12(3) declaration grants the Court jurisdiction over 
acts ‘committed in the territory of Ukraine’: see above n 69. 
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to clarify which war crimes provisions of the Rome Statute are applicable.73 This may require 
consideration of the territorial dispute over Crimea (including whether Crimea is Ukrainian 
territory that is occupied by Russia) and the degree of Russian control over separatists in eastern 
Ukraine. With respect to Crimea, in its 2016 report on preliminary examinations, the OTP stated:  
 
The information available suggests that the situation within the territory of Crimea 
amounts to an international armed conflict between Ukraine and the Russian 
Federation. This international armed conflict began at the latest on 26 February when 
the Russian Federation deployed members of its armed forces to gain control over 
parts of Ukrainian territory without the consent of the Ukrainian Government. The law 
of international armed conflict would continue to apply after 18 March 2014 to the extent that the 
situation within the territory of Crimea and Sevastopol factually amounts to an ongoing state of 
occupation.74 
 
With respect to eastern Ukraine, in its 2016 report on preliminary examinations, the OTP held 
that, based on the information available, the conditions for the existence of a non-international 
armed conflict had been met.75 In addition, it held that there was some evidence that an 
international armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine existed in the region as a result of direct 
military engagements between the two states.76 Importantly, the OTP also noted: 
 
For the purpose of determining whether the otherwise non-international armed 
conflict could be actually international in character, the Office is also examining 
allegations that the Russian Federation has exercised overall control over armed groups 
in eastern Ukraine … In conducting its analysis, the Office must assess whether the 
information available indicates that Russian authorities have provided support to the 
armed groups in the form of equipment, financing and personnel, and also whether 
they have generally directed or helped in planning actions of the armed groups in a 
manner that indicates they exercised genuine control over them.77 
 
Interestingly, though it recognises the relevance of the status of Crimea for the purposes of the 
applicable law, the OTP does not appear to have considered the preliminary question of the status 
of Crimea for the purposes of determining whether it is part of Ukraine’s ‘territory’ and thus within 
Ukraine’s Article 12(3) conferral of jurisdiction. This is notwithstanding its recognition that ICC 
jurisdiction is limited to crimes committed within the territory of Ukraine.78 As explained above, 
should a case concerning Crimea reach the Court, the (pre-)Trial Chamber would likely need to 
consider the status of Crimea both as a preliminary jurisdictional matter and as a consideration at 
the merits stage when determining the applicable law.  
 
 
 
III. THREE APPROACHES TO DISAGGREGATION 
 
                                                          
73 OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2016, [154]. 
74 Ibid, [158] (emphasis added). See also OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2018, [68]. 
75 OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2016, [168]. Those conditions are that the violence must have 
reached a certain level of intensity and that the non-state armed groups must be sufficiently organised: S Sivakumaran, 
The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict (OUP 2012) 164–80. 
76 OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2016, [169]. 
77 Ibid, [170]. See also OTP, Report on Preliminary Activities 2018, [73]. On the modalities by which a non-
international armed conflict becomes internationalized, see K Mačák, Internationalized Armed Conflicts in International Law 
(OUP, Oxford 2018). 
78 OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2017, [83]. 
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It is clear from the preceding section that many of the specific legal claims arising out of the 
Ukraine/Russia dispute over Crimea and eastern Ukraine potentially implicate that broader 
dispute. This raises the question as to what impact any such relationship between these claims and 
the broader inter-state dispute might have on the jurisdiction of the tribunals. Put differently, what 
are the consequences of the disaggregation of disputes for the ability of international tribunals to 
rule on particular legal claims?  
The approach that each of the tribunals above takes to this issue varies (not only across 
tribunals, but also across case law of individual tribunals). Three broad approaches are, however, 
discernible: first, the severability approach, whereby the tribunal explicitly isolates the particular 
claim, over which it has jurisdiction, from the broader dispute, over which it does not; second, the 
restrictive approach, whereby the tribunal considers the specific claim to be inseparable from the 
broader dispute, thereby depriving it of jurisdiction over the specific claim; third, the expansive 
approach, whereby the tribunal appears willingly to pronounce on matters over which it would not 
separately have jurisdiction where it is necessary to do so in addressing the claims over which it 
does have jurisdiction.  
Each approach is discussed in turn. The ongoing nature of the Ukraine/Russia litigation 
means that many of these tribunals are yet to make any pronouncements in the context of this 
dispute. The analysis that follows, however, considers the approach that has been adopted to such 
issues across the jurisprudence of different tribunals. The three approaches thus represent a general 
framework of relevance beyond the particular Ukraine/Russia cases.  
 
A. The severability approach 
 
The severability approach broadly describes those cases in which a tribunal recognises that its 
jurisdiction is limited to addressing the specific claims before it and not other aspects of the 
broader dispute to which those claims relate, but that jurisdiction over those specific claims can 
still be exercised as those claims are separable from the broader dispute. Amongst the tribunals 
seised of the Ukraine/Russia claims, the ICJ, the WTO dispute settlement system, and investment 
arbitrations have all followed this approach in particular cases.  
Regarding the ICJ, notwithstanding references to other allegations against Russia in 
Ukraine’s application,79 the Court, in its order on provisional measures,80 emphasised the restricted 
form in which the core legal claims were brought and its limited jurisdiction in the case: 
 
The context in which the present case comes before the Court is well known. In large 
parts of eastern Ukraine, that context is characterized by periods of extensive fighting 
which, as the record before the Court demonstrates, has claimed a large number of 
lives. The destruction, on 17 July 2014, of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 while it was 
flying over Ukrainian territory en route between Amsterdam and Kuala Lumpur, 
caused the deaths of 298 people. The Court is well aware of the extent of this human 
tragedy. Nevertheless, the case before the Court is limited in scope. In respect of the 
events in the eastern part of its territory, Ukraine has brought proceedings only under 
the ICSFT. With regard to the events in Crimea, Ukraine’s claim is based solely upon 
CERD and the Court is not called upon, as Ukraine expressly recognized, to rule upon 
any issue other than allegations of racial discrimination.81 
                                                          
79 See above at text to n 15. 
80 On filing its application to the Court, Ukraine also filed a request for the indication of provisional measures relating 
to Russia’s compliance with both the CERD and ICSFT. After finding prima facie jurisdiction under both treaties, it 
went on to indicate certain provisional measures concerning the CERD, but held that Ukraine had not met the 
plausibility of claims requirement for the indication of provisional measures concerning the ICSFT. See Ukraine v 
Russia, Order (Provisional Measures) (n 19). 
81 Ibid, [16]. 
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Consistent with its previous case law,82 the Court thus makes clear that its jurisdiction is both 
granted and limited by the two treaties under which the claims have been brought.83 The ICJ has 
been clear, however, that it may nonetheless look beyond the specific norms over which it has 
jurisdiction if necessary for their interpretation.84 As Lorand Bartels has noted, jurisdiction clauses 
(such as compromissory clauses) limit the principal norms, yet leave intact certain categories of 
incidental norms,85 the latter including norms used to interpret the former.86 There is, of course, a 
balance to be struck here. As the quote above from Sir Christopher Greenwood indicates,87 this 
balance is between ensuring that the Court can deal effectively with disputes (which could be 
undermined by omitting highly relevant extraneous rules), whilst simultaneously honouring the 
principle that states must consent to the jurisdiction of international tribunals. The controversy 
over the ICJ’s approach to these issues in the Oil Platforms case indicates the difficulty with where 
to strike such a balance, and indeed many of the criticisms of the Oil Platforms judgment suggested 
that the Court displaced rather than interpreted the applicable law.88  
Notwithstanding the quote above from the Court’s provisional measures order in Ukraine v 
Russia, suggesting its strict adherence to its limited jurisdiction, Russia nevertheless objects to the 
Court exercising jurisdiction in that case. Thus, in its preliminary objections, Russia argues:  
 
The invocation of the ICSFT and CERD is … artificial. Ukraine has made plain its 
wish to bring its misplaced allegations of annexation and aggression before the Court 
or other tribunals, and the current claims merely constitute one of Ukraine’s attempts 
inappropriately to shoehorn those allegations into one or more treaties that provide 
for compulsory dispute settlement.89 
 
More specifically, Russia argues that Ukraine’s invocation of the ICSFT as a basis for challenging 
alleged direct Russian support for terrorism ‘constitutes an invitation to circumvent Russia’s 
obvious lack of consent’ to ICJ jurisdiction.90 With respect to Ukraine’s CERD claims, Russia 
                                                          
82 See, eg, Bosnia v Serbia (n 21) [147] (‘[t]he jurisdiction of the Court in this case is based solely on Article IX of the 
Convention … It follows that the Court may rule only on the disputes between the Parties to which that provision 
refers … It has no power to rule on alleged breaches of other obligations under international law, not amounting to 
genocide, particularly those protecting human rights in armed conflict.’) Similarly, see Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v Serbia), Judgment [2015] ICJ Rep 3, [85]; Jadhav Case (India v 
Pakistan) [2019] Judgment (Merits) of 17 July 2019, [36].  
83 On the limiting effect of jurisdictional clauses, see Cannizzaro and Bonafé (n 1); M Papadaki, ‘Compromissory 
Clauses as the Gatekeepers of the Law to be ‘Used’ in the ICJ and the PCIJ’ (2014) 6 JIDS 560; Tams (n 1); L Bartels, 
‘Applicable Law and Jurisdiction Clauses: Where Does a Tribunal Find the Principal Norms Applicable to the Case 
Before It?’ in T Broude and Y Shany (eds), Multisourced Equivalent Norms in International Law (Hart 2011); S Rosenne, 
The Law and Practice of the International Court of Justice 1920–2005 (Martinus Nijhoff 2006) 648–9. 
84 Croatia v Serbia (n 82) [85] (‘[t]hat does not prevent the Court from considering, in its reasoning, whether a violation 
of international humanitarian law or international human rights law has occurred to the extent that this is relevant for 
the Court’s determination of whether or not there has been a breach of an obligation under the Genocide 
Convention’). Similarly, see;  Jadhav Case (n 82) [37]; Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States) 
Judgment (Merits) [2003] ICJ Rep 161, [42]; Case Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v 
Poland), Judgment (Preliminary Objections) [1925] PCIJ (Ser A) No 6, 18.  
85 Bartels (n 83).  
86 See also Papadaki (n 83) 569–76; A Gourgourinis, ‘The Distinction between Interpretation and Application of 
Norms in International Adjudication’ (2011) 2 JIDS 31. Though note that Papadaki (n 83) at 576 still demonstrates 
the limitations placed by the compromissory clause on the extraneous rules that can enter the adjudicative process via 
interpretation. 
87 See above at text to n 2. 
88 See, eg, the critique in Oil Platforms (n 84), Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, [49]; Oil Platforms, ibid, Separate 
Opinion of Judge Buergenthal, [29]; JA Green, ‘The Oil Platforms Case: An Error in Judgment?’ (2004) 9 JCSL 357, 
375–7. 
89 Preliminary Objections (Russia) (n 20) [4] (references omitted).  
90 Ibid, [129]. 
14 
 
submits that ‘[t]he real issue in the dispute between the parties does not concern racial 
discrimination but the status of Crimea’91 and that ‘[s]uch an issue does not fall within the Court’s 
jurisdiction ratione materiae under CERD’.92 
These objections are reminiscent of the same respondent’s preliminary objection to 
Georgia’s claims under the CERD in Georgia v Russia,93 where it argued that the true dispute 
between the two states was one concerning armed conflict, rather than racial discrimination; it thus 
invited the Court to characterise the dispute in this way, as opposed to one concerning the 
interpretation or application of the CERD, which would have resulted in a finding of no 
jurisdiction.94 Russia’s objections in both Georgia v Russia and Ukraine v Russia are premised on the 
idea that the disaggregation or framing of the dispute has resulted in claims that misrepresent its 
true nature, and that the real dispute is one over which the Court lacks jurisdiction. This is not an 
uncommon objection to be raised by respondents in ICJ cases.95 In its order on provisional 
measures in Ukraine v Russia, the Court did not share this view (which Russia had invoked at that 
stage in respect of the ICSFT specifically96), instead simply asserting that the factual allegations 
raised by Ukraine do appear prima facie to engage certain provisions of the ICSFT.97 Its view as to 
the severability of the claims under the CERD and ICSFT from the broader dispute between 
Ukraine and Russia thus enabled it to look at these claims in isolation. In much of its previous case 
law, the ICJ has taken a similar approach to this type of jurisdictional objection.98 
The severability approach has also been taken by the WTO Appellate Body in certain 
previous cases. Thus, in Mexico – Soft Drinks, the Appellate Body was faced with a claim from 
Mexico that Mexico’s WTO obligations towards the US were inapplicable as a result of the latter’s 
illegal refusal to establish a NAFTA panel to resolve what was claimed to be the broader bilateral 
dispute with which the US’ claims were allegedly inextricably linked. The Appellate Body held that 
examining such an argument  
 
… would entail a determination whether the United States has acted consistently or 
inconsistently with its NAFTA obligations. We see no basis in the DSU [Dispute 
Settlement Understanding] for panels and the Appellate Body to adjudicate non-WTO 
                                                          
91 Ibid, [295]. 
92 Ibid, [320]. 
93 Case Concerning Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v 
Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections of the Russian Federation (Vol 1), 1 December 2009, [3.10]. 
94 Ibid, [2.3]. 
95 Similar jurisdictional objections have been made by respondents in previous cases: eg the UK’s objections in Case 
Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising From the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie 
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United Kingdom), Judgment (Preliminary Objections) [1998] ICJ Rep 9, [24]–[25]; ibid, 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sir Robert Jennings (supporting the UK’s position that the case was wrongly brought 
under the Montreal Convention and thus that the Court lacked jurisdiction); Iran’s objections in Case Concerning United 
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v Iran), Judgment (Merits) [1980] ICJ Rep 3, [37]; the US’ 
objections in Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States), 
Judgment (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) [1984] ICJ Rep 392, [104]–[105]; the US’ objections in Alleged Violations of 
the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Iran v United States), Order, 3 October 2018, [34]–[35]; 
France’s objections in Immunities and Criminal Proceedings (Equatorial Guinea v France), Judgment (Preliminary Objections), 
6 June 2018, [60]–[61], [65]; Chile’s objections in Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v Chile), Judgment 
(Preliminary Objection) [2015] ICJ Rep 592, [28]; Canada’s objections in Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Spain v Canada), 
Judgment (Preliminary Objections) [1998] ICJ Rep 432, [26]–[27]; the US’ objections in Case Concerning Oil Platforms 
(Iran v United States), Preliminary Objection Submitted by the United States, 16 December 1993, [3.01]. 
96 Ukraine v Russia, Order (Provisional Measures) (n 19) [70]. 
97 Ibid, [29]–[31].  
98 See, eg, United States v Iran (n 95) [37]; Nicaragua v United States (n 95) [104]–[105]; Application of the Interim Accord of 13 
September 1995 (the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v Greece), Judgment (Merits) [2011] ICJ Rep 644, [37]; Case 
Concerning Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v Russian 
Federation), Judgment (Preliminary Objections) [2011] ICJ Rep 70, [32]; Bolivia v Chile (n 95) [32]–[34]; Alleged Violations 
of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Iran v United States), Order, 3 October 2018, [38]; Case 
Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v United States) [1996] ICJ Rep 803, Judgment (Preliminary Objections), [18]–[21].  
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disputes … Accepting Mexico's interpretation would imply that the WTO dispute 
settlement system could be used to determine rights and obligations outside the 
covered agreements.99 
 
It has been suggested that, ‘[w]hile this statement probably went too far, confusing interpretation 
with adjudication … the point for present purposes is that it clearly illustrates a deep reluctance 
on the part of the Appellate Body to be drawn into expressing an opinion on the content and 
meaning of international legal texts other than the covered agreements.’100 Having refused to 
engage with Mexico’s argument, the Appellate Body simply went on to assess the conformity of 
Mexico’s measures against the WTO covered agreements alone. It thus appeared to sever the 
WTO claims from the NAFTA dispute, leaving it free to rule on the former.  
As noted above, it does not appear that Ukraine raised any arguments in the Russia – Traffic 
in Transit proceedings that would have implicated the broader dispute (and non-WTO norms, such 
as the prohibitions on intervention and the use of force).101 However, should such arguments be 
raised in other WTO proceedings, it is not clear precisely what approach the Appellate Body would 
take. It may be that, as with its other jurisprudence, the Appellate Body would be willing to take 
account of non-WTO norms in order to interpret Article XXI GATT.102 Alternatively, it may 
follow its approach from Mexico – Soft Drinks and apply the WTO covered agreements whilst 
refusing to engage with non-WTO arguments. Indeed, the panel in Russia – Traffic in Transit was 
keen to emphasise the inconsequential nature of its conclusions for the broader inter-state 
dispute.103 
Finally, the severability approach can most clearly be seen in the awards already issued by 
some of the Crimea investment tribunals. It has been reported that a number of the tribunals in 
these cases have found jurisdiction whilst claiming not to have ruled on the question of sovereignty 
over Crimea.104 Indeed, at the time of writing, seven tribunals have reportedly decided on the merits 
and found in favour of the claimants.105  
                                                          
99 Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WT/DS308/AB/R, 6 March 2006, [56]. 
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Policy 116, 117.  
101 See above at text to nn 52–4. 
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Expropriation of Hotels, Apartments and Other Crimean Real Estate; Arbitrators Award Approximately $150 Million 
(Plus Legal Costs) for Breach of Ukraine Bilateral Investment Treaty’, IAReporter, 9 May 2018; Oschadbank v Russia, on 
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It appears that in the jurisdictional decisions, at least some of the tribunals determined that 
‘territory’ under the BIT could be defined solely for the purpose of the BIT as including territory 
over which one of the parties to the BIT exercises effective control,106 whether lawful or 
unlawful.107 Reports concerning the PJSC Ukrnafta v The Russian Federation and Stabil LLC et al v 
The Russian Federation jurisdictional decisions give some detail on the reasoning of the tribunals, 
noting that they held that Russia exercised effective control over Crimea through physical and legal 
acts, which, for the purposes of the BIT, was sufficient to constitute Russian ‘territory’.108 The 
tribunals made clear, however, that they did not have jurisdiction under Article 9 of the 1998 BIT 
to rule on the sovereignty question.109 Moreover, it appears that in its interventions, Ukraine argued 
that, though Crimea is a part of sovereign Ukrainian territory, Russia’s de facto control of the 
peninsula renders it Russian ‘territory’ for the purposes of the BIT.110 Indeed, an attempt by Russia 
to have these partial awards set aside in the Swiss Federal Tribunal was rejected, with the Tribunal 
holding that the arbitral tribunals did not err in finding that the BIT applied to Crimea.111  
These investment tribunals have thus accepted jurisdiction in cases implicating ancillary 
(territorial) disputes, but on the basis that they view the BIT as self-contained, with ‘territory’ 
capable of interpretation for the purposes of the BIT alone and without further consequence.112  
In this sense, these cases, as with those of the ICJ and WTO that were discussed above, fully 
embrace disaggregation, with the specific legal claims considered wholly separable from other 
aspects of the broader dispute.  
 
B. The restrictive approach 
 
The restrictive approach covers those cases in which a tribunal considers the specific claims over 
which it appears to have jurisdiction to be inseparable from other aspects of a dispute over which 
it does not have jurisdiction, resulting in the tribunal declining to exercise jurisdiction even over 
                                                          
Airport’, IAReporter, 15 February 2019; NJSC Naftogaz v Russia (n 55), on which see D Charlotin, ‘In New BIT Ruling, 
Russia Found Liable for Expropriation of Naftogaz Assets’, IAReporter, 1 March 2019; PJSC Ukrnafta v Russia and 
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sovereignty: Al-Skeini (n 42). 
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(n 55) case); Peterson, ‘In Jurisdiction Ruling’ (n 104) (in the Aeroport Belbek LLC et al v The Russian Federation (n 55) 
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111 Russia v A et al (n 109) [4.3.2];  Russia v A (Beschwerde gegen den Zwischenentscheid des Schiedsgerichts mit Sitz 
in Genf vom 26 Juni 2017 (PCA Nr. 2015-34)), 4A_396/2017, Judgment of 16 October 2018 (Swiss Federal Tribunal) 
[4.3.2] (judgment in German). For discussion, see L Bohner, ‘In Now-Public Decisions, Swiss Federal Tribunal 
Clarifies Reasons for Dismissing Challenges to Two Crimea-Related Investment Treaty Awards Against Russia’, 
IAReporter, 16 November 2018. 
112 Reports of the Everest Estate LLC et al v The Russian Federation (n 55) jurisdictional decision suggest a slightly different 
emphasis in the reasoning, such that the tribunal determined that the 1998 BIT applies to Crimea on the basis that no 
party explicitly objected: Jarrod Hepburn, ‘Investigation: Full Jurisdictional Reasoning’ (n 104). The Ukrainian 
Supreme Court upheld enforcement of the final Everest award in Ukraine: LE Peterson, ‘Russia Held Liable for 
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Russia’s request to stay the enforcement of the awards was also refused by the Hague Court of Appeal, which 
specifically noted that the investment claims can be resolved without giving an opinion on the status of Crimea: The 
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the former. In contrast to the severability approach, therefore, the restrictive approach does not 
accept that each aspect of the broader dispute can be disaggregated so as to leave intact jurisdiction 
over specific elements of that dispute. This restrictive approach can be seen in some case law of 
both the ICJ and UNCLOS tribunals.  
The ICJ’s clear support for the severability approach in both its provisional measures order 
in Ukraine v Russia and in earlier cases was set out above.113 However, there is also previous 
authority that the Court will reject jurisdiction in certain cases where either the ‘very essence of 
the dispute’ is something other than that over which the Court has jurisdiction (with the latter 
being only a secondary question),114 or, more basically, where addressing the question put to it 
requires a pre-determination of a different matter over which the Court has not been granted 
jurisdiction.115 As Peter Tzeng has noted,116 these tests bear a clear similarity to the tests adopted 
by the Court in its case law addressing the indispensable third party principle.117 
Russia’s jurisdictional objection before the ICJ, which, as noted, challenges the framing or 
characterisation of its dispute with Ukraine as one concerning the ICSFT and CERD,118 is not 
entirely analogous to these previous ICJ cases. The Interim Accord and Malaysia/Singapore cases are 
concerned with the slightly different situation where the Court is called upon to make a prior 
determination about a different dispute over which it has not been granted jurisdiction so that it 
might then rule on the matter over which it has been granted jurisdiction. The Court’s reasoning 
in the Aegean Sea case is closer in nature to Russia’s objection, as it raises the question about how 
to characterise a dispute (‘the very essence of the dispute’). Its focus, however, again appears to be 
on cases where the actual claim over which the Court has jurisdiction is something that can only 
be decided after resolving the ‘true’ dispute over which the Court does not have jurisdiction. In 
any event, though it was shown above that the existence of a broader dispute does not itself 
preclude the ICJ from dealing with the specific claim over which it has jurisdiction,119 it is clear 
that there are limits to the ICJ’s willingness to deal with one specific claim that arises from a 
broader dispute. 
As with the claims before the ICJ, Russia similarly objects that Ukraine’s 2016 UNCLOS 
claims before the Annex VII tribunal mischaracterise the ‘real dispute’, which, Russia argues, is 
‘the dispute with respect to sovereignty over land territory’, and that ‘the determination of that 
dispute is the unavoidable prerequisite to addressing the specific [UNCLOS] claims’.120 Such 
                                                          
113 See above at text to nn 97–8. 
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118 See above at text to nn 89–92. 
119 See above at text to n 98. 
120 Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait (Ukraine v The Russian Federation), 
Preliminary Objections of the Russian Federation: Volume I, 19 May 2018, [42]. See also Dispute Concerning Coastal 
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disputes are, Russia claims, outside the jurisdiction of UNCLOS tribunals as they do not concern 
the ‘interpretation or application’ of the Convention.121 UNCLOS tribunals have faced similar 
jurisdictional objections (that maritime claims implicate territorial sovereignty disputes) in certain 
previous cases,122 where one can see the restrictive approach again being endorsed.123  
The Mauritius v United Kingdom and Philippines v China awards concerned UNCLOS claims of 
this nature, and whilst both endorse a restrictive approach to jurisdiction, they differ in their 
reasoning and in their conclusions on the facts.124 In the former case, Mauritius brought a claim 
against the UK for the latter’s creation of a marine protected area (MPA) around the Chagos 
archipelago, alleging, in its first submission, that the UK is not permitted to declare an MPA as it 
is not the ‘coastal state’.125 In precisely the same way as in the Ukraine v Russia case before the 
Annex VII tribunal, the question of territorial sovereignty thus appeared to be implicated. The 
UK, similar to Russia’s response to Ukraine’s applications to the ICJ and the Annex VII tribunal, 
objected that Mauritius’ first submission reflected ‘an artificial re-characterization of the long-
standing sovereignty dispute as a “who is the coastal State” dispute’.126 Mauritius, on the other 
hand, argued that it was merely requesting the Tribunal to interpret a term within UNCLOS, that 
of ‘coastal state’.127  
The Tribunal held that it needed to determine the proper characterization of the dispute in 
order to determine whether it has jurisdiction (i.e. whether the dispute was concerned primarily 
with the interpretation and application of UNCLOS or with sovereignty).128 On the basis of the 
historical record of the dispute and the consequences of determining that the UK was not the 
coastal state (considered to extend beyond the validity of the MPA), the Tribunal concluded that 
‘the Parties’ dispute with respect to Mauritius’ First Submission is properly characterized as relating 
to land sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago.’129 It then held that, where the ‘real issue in the 
case’ and the ‘object of the claim’ do not relate to the Convention, an ‘incidental connection’ to 
the Convention cannot bring the dispute within the tribunal’s jurisdiction.130 Applying this test, the 
Tribunal concluded that, though ‘in some instances a minor issue of territorial sovereignty could 
indeed be ancillary to a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention’, 
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and thus within an UNCLOS tribunal’s jurisdiction, that was not the case here; it therefore 
considered itself to be without jurisdiction over Mauritius’ first submission.131 
Whereas the Tribunal in Mauritius v UK thus focused entirely on the character of the dispute 
(‘the real issue in the case’), a slightly different approach was taken by the tribunal in Philippines v 
China. In this case, China, like the UK in Mauritius v UK and Russia in both the ICJ and UNCLOS 
Ukraine v Russia cases, raised concerns with the disaggregation of the broader inter-state dispute 
and objected that the true dispute was not that over which the tribunal had jurisdiction.132 The 
Tribunal stated that ‘[t]he nature of the dispute may have significant jurisdictional implications, 
including whether the dispute can fairly be said to concern the interpretation or application of the 
Convention’ and that it is for the Tribunal to determine the characterization of the dispute based 
on the submissions of the parties and other relevant evidence.133 Importantly, the Tribunal began 
by emphasising that the existence of a sovereignty dispute between the parties did not mean that 
the claims before it were properly to be characterised as relating to sovereignty: ‘the Parties can 
readily be in dispute regarding multiple aspects of the prevailing factual circumstances or the legal 
consequences that follow from them.’134 It then held that it  
 
… might consider that the Philippines’ Submissions could be understood to relate to 
sovereignty if it were convinced that either (a) the resolution of the Philippines’ claims 
would require the Tribunal to first render a decision on sovereignty, either expressly 
or implicitly; or (b) the actual objective of the Philippines’ claims was to advance its 
position in the Parties’ dispute over sovereignty.135  
 
Thus, whereas the Mauritius v UK Tribunal relied solely on the characterisation of the dispute, the 
Tribunal in Philippines v China also considered a dispute to be outside its jurisdiction where the 
sovereignty question (though not the actual objective of the claims) must still be answered in order 
to rule on the UNCLOS claim. On the facts, it held neither of these to be the case as the Philippines 
had not asked the Tribunal to rule on sovereignty, nor was such a ruling implicitly required to 
address the Philippines’ submissions.136  
The factual similarity between Mauritius v UK and Ukraine v Russia might lead the Tribunal 
in the latter to follow the purely characterisation-based approach of the former, and it may well 
come to the same conclusion. Ukraine, however, argues that its claims are based on UNCLOS and 
that Russia’s objection that the real dispute is a sovereignty dispute is inadmissible and implausible 
given the international community’s rejection of its annexation of Crimea in the General Assembly; 
this is in contrast to the long-running sovereignty dispute that was the context for the Mauritius v 
UK case.137 Should the Tribunal follow this argument, it might view the facts as closer to those 
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cases recognised in Mauritius v UK in which a minor incidental sovereignty question may be 
resolved where the key issue concerns UNCLOS rights.138  
Alternatively, should the Tribunal follow the approach in Philippines v China, this could either 
support or undermine Ukraine’s claims. On the one hand, Philippines v China explicitly recognised 
the co-existence of maritime and sovereignty claims and the possibility of separating the two.139 
On the other hand, in addition to the characterisation approach, the Tribunal also held that an 
UNCLOS tribunal would lack jurisdiction if any decision on sovereignty is a necessary precursor 
to addressing the UNCLOS claim,140 which, as stated above, is likely to be the case here. This 
appears a stricter test than that in Mauritius v UK. 
To conclude, there are some interesting parallels between the approaches of the UNCLOS 
tribunals and the ICJ in cases endorsing this restrictive approach. Whilst both Philippines v China 
and the ICJ explicitly recognise that the disaggregation of disputes need not raise jurisdictional 
problems where they are entirely separable, discrete legal claims,141 it is also clear that the UNCLOS 
cases reflect a similar (though perhaps greater142) concern to some of the ICJ jurisprudence cited 
above where the claims are considered inseparable from the broader dispute. In both fora, this 
concern has focused on the characterisation of the dispute—the ‘very essence of the dispute’143 or 
the ‘real issue in the case’144—as well as the question of whether a prior determination is needed 
of an incidental matter that itself is outside the jurisdiction of the tribunal.145 Such approaches 
suggest that the disaggregation of broader disputes into discrete legal claims can have a limiting 
effect on the jurisdiction of international tribunals. 
 
C. The expansive approach 
 
The final approach to these issues that can be seen in particular cases is referred to here as the 
expansive approach. This refers to those cases in which a particular tribunal, faced with a claim 
that implicates other aspects of a broader dispute over which it would not otherwise have 
jurisdiction, nevertheless exercises jurisdiction over the specific claim and, importantly, does not 
shy away from making other determinations regarding that broader dispute.  
The expansive approach can especially be seen in the case law of the ECtHR. It was noted 
above that the pending ECHR claims (both inter-state and individual) will likely implicate the 
broader inter-state dispute concerning alleged Russian interference in eastern Ukraine and 
(potentially) the sovereignty dispute over Crimea. This notwithstanding, the ECtHR’s previous 
case law that was noted above146 indicates that it is unlikely to view this as a challenge to its 
jurisdiction over the ECHR claims themselves; this is in contrast to the restrictive approach, which, 
as noted, sees such incidental matters as undermining the tribunals’ jurisdiction even over the 
specific claims. Moreover, the Strasbourg Court’s case law suggests that it will also not shy away 
from making determinations over those incidental matters, in contrast to the severability approach, 
                                                          
138 Mauritius v UK (n 124) [221]. Suggesting this, see Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, 
and Kerch Strait, Written Observations and Submissions of Ukraine on Jurisdiction (n 26) [51]. 
139 Philippines v China (n 124) [152]. 
140 Ibid, [153]. 
141 See, eg, Georgia v Russia (n 98) [32]; Philippines v China (n 124) [152]. 
142 For a particularly restrictive approach to disaggregation and jurisdiction in UNCLOS proceedings, see Southern 
Bluefin Tuna Case (Australia and New Zealand v Japan) (Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility), 4 August 2000 (2000) 
39 ILM 1359, [54] (the Annex VII tribunal held that it would be ‘artificial’ to treat Australia and New Zealand’s 
UNCLOS claims as separate from claims arising under a different treaty over which the tribunal did not have 
jurisdiction; it therefore concluded that it could not exercise jurisdiction over those UNCLOS claims due to its view 
as to the operation of a dispute settlement provision in that other treaty). This decision has been criticised: see, eg, A 
Boyle, ‘The Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration’ (2001) 50 ICLQ 447.  
143 Aegean Sea (n 27) [83]. 
144 Mauritius v UK (n 124) [220]. 
145 Philippines v China (n 124) [153]; Malaysia/Singapore (n 115) [297]–[299]. 
146 See above at text to nn 40–3. 
21 
 
which, as noted, emphasises the separability of the specific claims and the tribunals’ determinations 
thereunder from the broader dispute. Thus, its northern Cyprus and Transdniestria cases confirm 
a willingness on the part of the ECtHR to address incidental questions of territorial sovereignty in 
order to rule on the specific claims within its jurisdiction.147 Similarly, the Court in these cases 
willingly ruled on the extent of foreign state intervention (including, in Transdniestria, control of 
separatists) in order to determine whether jurisdiction existed under the Convention.148 
This expansive approach to jurisdiction can also be seen in the approach of the ICC’s OTP 
in relation to its preliminary examination into the situation in Ukraine, as well as in some previous 
jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals. The possibility of the inter-state Ukraine/Russia 
dispute being implicated in the ICC proceedings, with respect both to jurisdiction and applicable 
law, was noted above.149 It is clear from its reports on preliminary activities that the OTP considers 
incidental determinations about the status of Crimea (i.e. whether or not it is occupied and thus 
not sovereign Russian territory) and the extent of Russian control over insurgent groups in eastern 
Ukraine to fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC.150  
It remains to be seen what approach the ICC might take to such issues, i.e. whether it will 
follow the expansive approach suggested by the OTP, the severability approach followed in much 
ICJ case law and the Crimea BIT arbitrations, or the restrictive approach of the UNCLOS tribunals 
and certain ICJ cases. It could be instructive to look at previous case law of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) concerning the required level of control over 
non-state groups by a foreign state for an apparently non-international armed conflict to be 
considered international in character. This jurisprudence certainly suggests a willingness by (some) 
international criminal tribunals to make determinations that those tribunals consider as having 
implications beyond the particular case at hand. Thus, the ICTY famously took the view that the 
test for the level of foreign state control of armed groups required for a conflict to be considered 
international was equivalent to the test for state responsibility for the conduct of individuals under 
their control, such that any determination as to the former was seen as necessarily making a 
determination regarding the latter.151 Though the ICC has applied the same ‘overall control’ test as 
the ICTY in such situations, it has not taken a position on whether this is considered to be relevant 
only for the purposes of determining the applicable law before the ICC, or whether it is also viewed 
as implicating the controlling state’s responsibility under international law.152  
Interestingly, (pre-) Trial Chambers are likely to face similar issues regarding the scope of 
their jurisdiction in other contexts, such as any future case relating to Palestine where questions of 
statehood might be raised as a preliminary objection,153 or cases concerning the crime of 
aggression, which necessarily would implicate state responsibility.154 
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did emphasise that it did not need to rule on the legality or illegality of Turkey’s military intervention, thus following 
the severability approach in that respect).  
149 See above at text to nn 72–7. 
150 See above at text to nn 74 and 77. 
151 Prosecutor v Tadić (Judgment) IT-94-1A, Appeals Chamber (15 July 1999) [98]. The ICJ disagreed, viewing the two 
tests as separate and without consequence for one another: Bosnia v Serbia (n 21) [403]–[405]. On this, see R Jorritsma, 
‘Where General International Law Meets International Humanitarian Law: Attribution of Conduct and the 
Classification of Armed Conflicts’ (2018) 23 JCSL 405.  
152 Prosecutor v Germain Katanga (Judgment) ICC-01/04-01/07, Trial Chamber (7 March 2014), [1178]; Prosecutor v Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo (Judgment) ICC-01/05-01/08, Trial Chamber (21 March 2016) [130]. 
153 The OTP, for the purposes of Palestine’s Article 12(3) declarations and accession to the Rome Statute, has simply 
followed the UNGA’s designations of Palestine, first as an observer entity and subsequently as a non-member observer 
state, in determining whether Palestine is a ‘state’ for the purposes of Article 12 of the Rome Statute: ICC Press 
Release, ‘The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, opens a preliminary examination of 
the situation in Palestine’, ICC-OTP-20150116-PR1083, 16 January 2015. 
154 See, eg, D Akande and A Tzanakopoulos, ‘Treaty Law and ICC Jurisdiction over the Crime of Aggression’ (2018) 
29 EJIL 939, 959 (acknowledging the consent-based concerns with the ICC exercising jurisdiction over the crime of 
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IV. UNDERSTANDING THE DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO DISAGGREGATION 
 
The three approaches discussed above (severability, restrictive and expansive) reflect very different 
ways of engaging with the phenomenon of disaggregation of disputes in international law and its 
impact on jurisdiction. In particular, they reflect different approaches to where the balance referred 
to by Sir Christopher Greenwood lies—the severability and restrictive approaches might be viewed 
as the most faithful to the principle of consent, whereas the expansive approach might be seen as 
more appropriate from the perspective of the effective resolution of disputes. 
A number of explanations can be given for the varied approaches of the tribunals to these 
issues. First, it is clear that the substantive area of law at issue affects the approaches available to 
the tribunals. For example, the severability approach adopted by the ICJ in many cases and by the 
Crimea investment arbitrations was not available to the ICJ in Aegean Sea or the UNCLOS tribunal 
in Mauritius v UK, given that those latter cases concerned law of the sea claims in which the ‘land 
dominates the sea’ principle is well established; in such cases, one often cannot sever maritime 
disputes from sovereignty disputes over adjacent land.155 In the case of WTO panels and the 
Appellate Body, Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding have been seen as 
placing a particular restriction on their applicable law, including in Mexico – Soft Drinks, in which 
the Appellate Body viewed Mexico’s invocation of NAFTA as inconsistent with those 
provisions.156 
Second, each tribunal has different jurisdictional bases and terms of reference that 
necessarily affect how such matters are addressed. Indeed, the restrictive approach endorsed in the 
Aegean Sea and Interim Accord cases may well have been influenced by the fact that in both cases the 
respondent state objected that the claims fell within a reservation to their acceptance of the relevant 
compromissory clauses.157 In Malaysia/Singapore, the Court’s jurisdiction was based on a special 
agreement between the two states by which they referred the sovereignty dispute to the Court, but 
not any delimitation of the territorial waters of the two states, the latter of which the Court 
determined would need to be answered in order to address the former.158 The jurisdictional remit 
of the particular tribunal is also particularly important for regime-specific tribunals, such as those 
under the WTO or UNCLOS, which have a clearly restricted subject-matter jurisdiction.159 
These considerations provide some important context for understanding the approaches of 
the ICJ, UNCLOS tribunals, investment tribunals, and WTO dispute settlement system to these 
questions in the cases discussed above. However, they do not assist in explaining the different 
approaches of other tribunals, such as the ECtHR, in particular cases, whose jurisdiction is 
similarly limited by its constituent instrument.160 Some further explanation is therefore needed. 
One possibility is that the different approaches outlined above might be influenced by the different 
views of each of these tribunals as to their own roles and to the international judicial function 
                                                          
aggression and thereby making incidental determinations about the responsibility of a state under international law); 
Tzeng (n 12) 498–9.  
155 As noted, the nature of the claims in Philippines v China meant that the tribunal was able to do this, and this had 
been explicitly pleaded by the Philippines: Philippines v China (n 124) [153]. 
156 Mexico – Soft Drinks (n 99) [53]; L Bartels, ‘Applicable Law in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings’ (2001) 35 
JWT 499. The provisions state that the DSB, panels and the Appellate Body ‘cannot add to or diminish the rights and 
obligations provided in the covered agreements’. 
157 See above at nn 114–15. 
158 See above at n 115. 
159 See, eg Bartels (n 102) 11–12; N Klein, ‘The Effectiveness of the UNCLOS Dispute Settlement Regime: Reaching 
for the Stars?’ (2014) ASIL Proc 359, 363. 
160 Art 32 ECHR (‘[t]he jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all matters concerning the interpretation and 
application of the Convention and the Protocols thereto’). 
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more generally. The apparent reluctance in the cases above of the ICJ, UNCLOS tribunals, and 
WTO panels and Appellate Body to appear to be making determinations beyond their jurisdiction 
mirrors Cesare Romano’s taxonomy of international courts and tribunals in which he groups these 
three sets of bodies together, noting that  
 
… because of their state versus state nature, in these courts, diplomacy and sovereignty 
play important roles. These are the courts where the arbitral heritage and dispute 
settlement original rationale of international courts and tribunals is the most evident. 
They are, in a way, old-style courts, carrying in their structure and jurisdiction traits of 
the early days of the development of the current galaxy of international bodies.161 
 
The ICJ, for example, though differing in important respects from its predecessors, does at the 
same time reflect a certain continuity with the Permanent Court of International Justice (and even 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration) in its identity as an organ for the settlement of bilateral inter-
state disputes, reflected most clearly in the retention of the requirement of consent to 
jurisdiction.162 This consensual basis of jurisdiction might help to explain the Court’s ‘restraint and 
caution’ in certain cases,163 including its approach in its provisional measures order in Ukraine v 
Russia in which it emphasised its limited jurisdiction and the self-contained nature of the claims.164 
The Court, in this respect, is said to view itself as being ‘in a transactional position in relation to 
the parties’,165 and thus it exercises restraint not to go beyond the remit of its jurisdiction when 
addressing the specific inter-state dispute before it. Both the severability and restrictive approaches 
that were shown above to have been followed by the ICJ chime with this restrained view of the 
Court, as they both reflect (albeit to differing degrees) a limited approach to jurisdiction.   
One can also see similar arguments being made with respect to the dispute settlement 
regimes under UNCLOS and the WTO.166 In the case of the WTO dispute settlement system, 
Joseph Weiler has argued that the diplomatic ethos of early GATT panels continues to influence 
the approaches of WTO panels and the Appellate Body.167 Indeed, Andrew Lang has invoked 
Weiler’s thesis as a possible explanation for the WTO Appellate Body’s restrained decision-making 
in certain areas, which might help to explain its reluctance in Mexico – Soft Drinks to appear to be 
stepping beyond the covered agreements: 
                                                          
161 CPR Romano, ‘A Taxonomy of International Rule of Law Institutions’ (2011) 2 JIDS 241, 265. For a similar 
taxonomy, see RO Keohane, A Moravcsik, and A-M Slaughter, ‘Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and 
Transnational’ (2000) 54 Intl Org 457. 
162 GI Hernández, The International Court of Justice and the Judicial Function (OUP 2014) 40 (‘[t]he Permanent Court 
transcended, at least partially, the substantially arbitral form of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, but retained a 
residual element of arbitral dispute-resolution in the consent required for it to take jurisdiction. The present 
International Court, with the same limitation on its jurisdiction, is no different’); M Bedjaoui, The New World Order and 
the Security Council: Testing the Legality of its Acts (Martinus Nijhoff 1994) 75 (‘… conceptually, there has been no 
substantial evolution of the judicial function from one Court [PCIJ] to the other [ICJ]’); R Kolb, The Elgar Companion 
to the International Court of Justice (Edward Elgar 2014) 24–6.  
163 H Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court (Stevens & Sons 1958) 76 (‘…  a further 
reason for restraint and caution in the international sphere, namely, the fact of the voluntary nature of the jurisdiction 
of international tribunals’); Hernández, ibid, 50.  
164 See above at text to n 81. 
165 Hernández (n 162) 54 (using the non ultra petita principle as an example of how the Court occupies this transactional 
position); H Thirlway, ‘The Drafting of ICJ Decisions: Some Personal Recollections and Observations’ (2006) 5 
Chinese J Intl L 15, 23–4; F Berman, ‘The International Court of Justice as an ‘Agent’ of Legal Development’ in CJ 
Tams and J Sloan (eds), The Development of International Law by the International Court of Justice (OUP 2013).  
166 With respect to UNCLOS, see N Klein, ‘Expansions and Restrictions in the UNCLOS Dispute Settlement Regime: 
Lessons from Recent Decisions’ (2016) 15 Chinese J Intl L 403, 415 (noting, as Sir Christopher Greenwood did in the 
context of the ICJ, the tension between effective resolution of maritime disputes and adherence to the principle of 
consent in UNCLOS dispute resolution). 
167 J Weiler, ‘The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats – Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy 
of WTO Dispute Settlement’ (2001) 35 JWT 191. 
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… it does seem possible that the particular judicial style of the Appellate Body, its 
particular understanding of the judicial function and of the place of dispute settlement 
in the overall institutional structure, is a lawyerly expression of that diplomatic ethos 
carried out through judicial techniques. It is very different from the approach to 
fragmentation that we see in other institutions – think, for example, of the European 
Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights and the German Constitutional 
Court – in which the imagined role of the judicature is an altogether more “heroic” 
one, standing firmly on behalf of fundamental norms, defining the basic commitments 
of a political body or acting as the spokesperson for an imagined coherent legal 
order.168 
 
Tribunals such as the ECtHR (particularly when addressing individual claims) do not fit so neatly 
into the ‘dispute settlement’ category—they are not in a ‘transactional position in relation to the 
parties’169—but reflect ‘courts’ in a more fundamental sense. They are said to represent the ‘move 
from party-focused to legality-focused’ tribunals,170 and from consensual to compulsory 
jurisdiction (in contrast to the ICJ, for example).171 In looking beyond bilateral inter-state disputes, 
and instead at (individual) human rights claims or individual criminal responsibility, bodies such as 
the ECtHR and ICC may place different weight on considerations such as consent when compared 
with the classic inter-state dispute settlement tribunals.  
This, again, might go some way in explaining why the ECtHR, for example, not only does 
not generally claim that its rulings are without consequence for the broader inter-state disputes 
into which they sometimes fall, but occasionally explicitly makes legal determinations relevant to 
those broader disputes when ruling on the petition before it.172 Indeed, drawing a comparison to 
the often more restricted approach of the ICJ to its jurisdiction, Yuval Shany has noted that ‘the 
legitimizing role of consent may be greater for some courts than for others’ and that the move 
towards conferring compulsory jurisdiction on certain regime courts suggests that states ‘place in 
some areas of their relations a lesser premium on consent … [instead preferring] the greater degree 
of effectiveness in dispute resolution’.173 This is linked to the ECtHR’s view of its own function, 
whereby it sees ‘its mission under the ECHR as primarily directed at the promotion of respect for 
human rights’.174  
The argument should not, of course, be taken too far, or be seen as endorsing an essentialist 
account of international tribunals and their approaches to the jurisdictional issues discussed in this 
article. Tribunals do not follow a monolithic approach here. In suggesting that the ICJ’s approach 
to these issues generally correlates with its historically inter-state dispute settlement function, I do 
not argue that the Court perceives itself as serving only this bilateral dispute settlement function, 
nor indeed that such a function can be performed without any broader consequence.175 It is also 
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not to say that the principle of consent is always decisive for the ICJ when deciding issues of 
jurisdiction and admissibility.176 Similarly, if, in their reasoning, the Mauritius v UK and Philippines v 
China tribunals endorsed a restrictive approach to these issues, in other respects UNCLOS 
tribunals have been more expansive in their approach to jurisdiction.177 With respect to the WTO 
Appellate Body, when viewed from other perspectives, its approach can also be seen as radical.178 
Finally, the character of the Strasbourg Court too must not be over-simplified or caricatured as 
always endorsing an expansive interpretation of its own jurisdiction.179  
The point here is not to flatten these nuances or to present a single explanation for the 
different approaches of each tribunal in any given case. Instead, the point is much more limited. 
It is simply that the different space within the architecture of international tribunals that organs 
such as the ICJ, UNCLOS tribunals, and Appellate Body occupy, in contrast to the ECtHR and 
ICC, might influence their approaches to the issues explored in this article.180 Which of the three 
approaches a tribunal adopts in any given case, therefore, may give some insight into how a 
particular tribunal understands its function. Importantly, as noted above, other considerations 
including the jurisdictional basis, the applicable law, and the substantive area of law will also all 
likely influence a particular tribunal’s approach in a specific case. 
These considerations regarding why one tribunal adopts the approach it does in a particular 
case might also help to inform our view of when each approach could be appropriate, whilst 
keeping in mind the caveat that any firm conclusion on this can only be made on a case-by-case 
basis. The severability approach, of course, offers a balance between enabling the tribunal to 
contribute to resolving the specific claim whilst remaining faithful to the principle of consent. It 
thus offers an attractive default option for any tribunal with a limited jurisdiction that is facing the 
types of jurisdiction or admissibility challenges discussed in this article.  
The restrictive approach, though similarly reflective of the enduring role of consent in 
international dispute settlement, is more extreme, as the tribunal refuses even to rule on the issue 
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over which it seems to have jurisdiction where that would have implications for the broader dispute 
over which it does not. Where the nature of a particular tribunal is firmly rooted in the inter-state 
dispute settlement tradition, and particularly where there is no compulsory jurisdiction, adherence 
to the consent of the disputing states might be thought to carry special weight given its important 
legitimizing role.181 Given this, the restrictive approach might be thought the more appropriate 
option for such tribunals. However, since this approach involves a complete renunciation of any 
judicial role in settling the dispute before the tribunal, it should only exceptionally be followed. 
Indeed, as noted, the ICJ and UNCLOS cases adopting this approach all have either strong 
jurisdictional and/or substantive law justifications for doing so.182  
Applying the restrictive approach beyond those specific contexts is problematic. The 
Philippines v China Tribunal’s version of the restrictive approach, for example, is arguably too broad 
to be applied more generally by international tribunals, as it leaves no room for a tribunal to make 
a necessary incidental determination prior to ruling on the specific claims before it, no matter how 
minor is the incidental determination.183 Indeed, as the line between interpretation and application 
blurs, the Philippines v China approach risks excluding an important source of legal reasoning.184 
Furthermore, whilst the approach of the Mauritius v UK tribunal was more balanced, recognising 
minor incidental sovereignty determinations to fall within the jurisdiction of UNCLOS tribunals, 
its focus on the character of the dispute (‘the real issue in the case’) is a challenge to the entire 
phenomenon of disaggregation of disputes. That is to say, rejecting a claim on the basis that it does 
not reflect the ‘real’ dispute fails to recognise that bringing highly specific legal claims as a means 
of litigating one part of a much broader (and perhaps quite different) dispute is a consequence of 
this structural feature of international judicial settlement.185   
Finally, the expansive approach suggests much less of a preoccupation with consent than 
the other two approaches, and, again, the possible explanations for the ECtHR’s use of this 
approach offer some guidance as to when it might be appropriate. Thus, the conferral by states on 
the ECtHR of compulsory jurisdiction, combined with its focus on claims that transcend the 
traditional inter-state dispute settlement model, suggest that its legitimacy is derived less from the 
continuing influence of consent and more from its function as a rule of law institution. This view 
of the Court is, of course, supported by its status as a human rights court, applying rules that it has 
at times explicitly held to be ‘special’ within the broader field of public international law.186 The 
same arguments would seem to apply, mutatis mutandis, to the ICC. It is clear, however, that the 
more traditional institutions, particularly the ICJ, for whom the continuing role of consent plays a 
significant legitimizing function, may face a greater challenge in justifying the expansive 
approach,187 though, again, other considerations may prove decisive.  
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This article has explored the phenomenon of what is termed the ‘disaggregation of disputes’, by 
which is meant the separation of broad inter-state disputes into discrete legal claims before 
different international tribunals, each with a specialised jurisdiction. In so doing, the article 
employs the ongoing Ukraine/Russia dispute as a case study in this phenomenon, considering the 
range of legal claims before different international courts and tribunals, the relationship between 
them, and the potential jurisdictional challenges that can arise as a result of this disaggregation. 
Importantly, as these cases are ongoing, the article draws on previous case law across a range of 
tribunals. In so doing, it reveals three broad approaches to these issues, offering an original 
analytical framework of relevance beyond the Ukraine/Russia litigation to international dispute 
settlement more generally. Which approach each tribunal seised in the Ukraine/Russia dispute 
might take remains to be seen. 
The analysis reveals significant variance in how international tribunals engage with the 
phenomenon of disaggregation, both across different tribunals and across different cases before 
the same tribunal. It has been asked whether one might discern a general principle regarding how 
international tribunals address cases in which a broader dispute over which they do not have 
jurisdiction is implicated in the process of adjudicating the claims over which they do have 
jurisdiction.188 However, the variance revealed by the above analysis does not augur well for such 
a general principle. Indeed, as set out in section four, there are various case-specific considerations 
that might influence the approach of a tribunal to this issue in any given case. Furthermore, as 
argued in that section, the understanding of a particular tribunal to its function might also play 
some role here. Attempting to distil a general principle may not, therefore, be fruitful.189  
It should finally be repeated that this article has not sought to engage with the normative 
debates surrounding the multiplication of international courts and tribunals. The fact that the 
structure of international dispute settlement can result in the disaggregation of disputes has been 
presented as both a blessing and a curse. For some, the opportunity that this provides for states 
to litigate and potentially resolve discrete legal aspects of long-term and intractable disputes is 
significant.190 For others, this disaggregation of disputes carries with it such negative externalities 
as forum-shopping, overlapping jurisdiction, and abuse of process.191 Indeed, Russia’s arguments 
in these cases has extended to such objections. For example, in its preliminary objections to 
Ukraine’s application to the ICJ, Russia argues that ‘the claims brought before the ICJ and the 
ECtHR have the same essential basis: they rely on the same facts, they allege violations of the same 
basic rights and they seek equivalent remedies.’192 Moreover, in its preliminary objections to 
Ukraine’s 2016 UNCLOS claims, Russia argues that Ukraine’s alleged shoehorning of the 
sovereignty dispute over Crimea into the Convention constitutes a ‘misuse of the process’ under 
Part XV UNCLOS.193 Whether any of the tribunals involved in the Ukraine/Russia cases would 
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accept such lis pendens or abuse of process-based arguments remains to be seen.194 Given that 
multiple, overlapping claims are a consequence of the disaggregated nature of international judicial 
settlement, such objections are likely to continue to arise in future cases.  
 
                                                          
194 On the possibility of applying such concepts in international law, see Pauwelyn and Salles (n 10); Oellers-Frahm (n 
10); C McLachlan, Lis Pendens in International Litigation (Brill 2009); AV Lowe, ‘Overlapping Jurisdiction in International 
Tribunals’ (1999) 20 Aust YB Intl L 191. 
